Hypersonic glide vehicles have quickly become the new buzzword in missile defense debates. They capture headlines with their blistering speeds and unpredictable flight paths. Russia, China, and the United States are all racing to deploy them, while adapting doctrines to also meet the challenge. But while hypersonic missile defense is important, it is only one piece of a far bigger puzzle. Modern ground-based air defense must be ready to counter a full spectrum of threats. These include traditional ballistic missiles and stealthy cruise weapons. They also face relentless drone swarms and high-speed sea-skimming attacks. Each category poses a different set of challenges. The real test will be building a layered and flexible system. This system must be capable of defeating all threats at once.
For much of the Cold War, air defense planning was dominated by a relatively narrow set of threats. Strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the occasional cruise missile defined the upper end of the danger spectrum. Systems were designed suitably. The past two decades, though, have transformed this picture. Advances in missile technology have increased threats. The proliferation of drones adds to these threats. The miniaturization of sophisticated guidance systems contributes to a threat environment of far greater diversity and complexity.
Among the newest and most talked-about additions to this landscape are hypersonic glide vehicles. Flying at speeds above Mach 5 and capable of maneuvering in the upper atmosphere, they show a formidable challenge. Unlike ballistic missiles, whose trajectories can be plotted with high precision, hypersonic glide vehicles can change course mid-flight. This ability complicates prediction and interception. Russia’s Avangard, China’s DF-ZF, and the U.S. Common-Hypersonic Glide Body have all made headlines, each portrayed as a weapon that could overwhelm existing defences. NATO has taken the threat seriously, with new doctrine, enhanced sensors, and experimental intercept concepts now in development.
Yet the fascination with hypersonics risks distorting the broader reality. These systems may be among the most advanced threats, but they are far from the only ones that matter. Defending any modern state requires addressing various target categories. This is particularly true for states on NATO’s northern and eastern flanks. Each category poses distinct operational challenges. If policy, procurement, and training focus too heavily on the “buzzword of the year,” there is a danger. This approach might leave critical vulnerabilities unaddressed.
Consider the enduring presence of ballistic missiles. Their flight paths are predictable compared to hypersonics. However, they travel at immense speeds during re-entry. They can also carry sophisticated decoys. Intercepting them requires advanced missile systems. It also needs the ability to distinguish genuine warheads from countermeasures in a matter of seconds. Cruise missiles, in contrast, travel more slowly. They fly at low altitude and often hug the terrain to evade radar detection. Their approach makes them dangerously close to their targets. The challenge here lies not in speed, but in early detection and coordination across a dispersed defensive network.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are drones and loitering munitions. Individually, they may be slow, small, and inexpensive. However, they are often deployed in swarms. These swarms can overwhelm sensors and exhaust missile stocks. This creates an unfavourable cost exchange for defenders who use expensive interceptors against cheap threats. Such attacks have become a daily occurrence in conflicts like Ukraine, making them a persistent drain on resources and attention. Another category of concern is the high-speed, low-altitude missile, such as sea-skimming anti-ship weapons. These give defenders only seconds to react and are made harder to detect by radar clutter from the sea surface.
What becomes clear from this spectrum of threats is that there is no single “most dangerous” category. Each type of target exploits different gaps in coverage, detection, and response. Hypersonics are not the end of air defence, nor are they a singular revolution. They are simply the latest addition to an expanding family of challenges that demand simultaneous attention. A brigade commander defending a coastal city might never see a hypersonic weapon. Despite this, they still have to fend off daily drone incursions. They also face sporadic cruise missile strikes and the looming threat of ballistic missile salvos.
The future of ground-based air defence will not be defined by one technology or one adversary’s innovation. It will depend on the creation of a truly multi-vector shield. This shield must detect and track at every altitude and speed. It should employ interceptors matched to the cost and nature of the threat. Additionally, it needs to fuse data from space, air, sea, and ground in near real-time. This requires investment not only in interceptors. It also requires investment in the invisible architecture of command and control. Additionally, investment is needed in sensor fusion and network resilience.
Hypersonic glide vehicles deserve the attention they are receiving, but they should not monopolise it. The most effective air defence strategy recognises the equal importance of all threat categories. It also designs for the reality that threats will appear not in isolation, but together. They will come in complex and overlapping attack patterns. In that environment, success will belong to those who build systems. Their doctrines must be flexible enough to fight all threats at once.
