Eastern European allies were right about Russia all along. Western Europeans only woke up in 2014, and many not until 2022.

Summary: Eastern European countries saw the Russian threat coming and consistently documented this in official documents from the early 2000s. Western European powers were overly optimistic and had to dramatically correct course, first in 2014 and then sharply in 2022.

Ground-based air defense went from being a downgraded capability to a critical shortfall that everyone is now investing heavily in—15–20 years too late compared to when the threat actually materialized.

From 2000 to 2020, Western Europe believed that large-scale conflict was a thing of the past, while Poland and the Baltics consistently warned in official documents about Russian aggression.

Ukraine 2022 proved who was right.

Ground-based air defense shifted overnight from being deprioritized to a critical shortfall.
Now, many European countries are spending massive sums on air defense, investments they should have made 15 years ago.
European NATO members and Nordic countries underwent a fundamental change in their documented assessments of conventional warfare and the need for ground-based air defense from 2000 to 2025.

Eastern European allies proved to be more prescient than their Western European partners, with 2014 marking the decisive turning point for serious threat reorientation across the continent. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered the most dramatic defense reorientation since the Cold War, making ground-based air defense a top priority.

Research identifies three distinct phases:

• Post-Cold War optimism (2000–2008)
• Gradual awakening (2008–2014)
• Acute reorientation (2014–2025)

While Eastern European allies consistently documented Russian threats in official documents, it took years for Western European powers to fully recognize the changed security situation.

Nordic threat perceptions

Norway underwent the most dramatic policy reversal with its Long-Term Defense Plan 2024–2036, proposing a historic investment of NOK 600 billion over 12 years, effectively doubling the defense budget by 2036. This marks a fundamental shift from being merely a recipient of allied reinforcements to serving as a transit and contributing ally to the defense of the entire Nordic-Baltic region.

Sweden’s strategic documents show a “brutal awakening” after 2014, culminating in the NATO application in 2022. The acquisition of Patriot (LvS 103) in 2021 and the reactivation of Launch Unit 23 for Gotland’s defense demonstrate concrete measures in response to Russian Iskander missiles deployed in Kaliningrad.

Denmark established a comprehensive defense agreement for 2024–2033 worth DKK 155 billion, including the creation of an air defense wing at Flyvestation Skalstrup in 2025. Denmark’s approach emphasizes rapid capability development through both temporary and permanent systems.

Finland chose the Rafael David’s Sling air defense system in 2023, capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at over 15,000 meters altitude. The 2024 defense report states that “Russia has entered a more open, unpredictable, and prolonged confrontation with the West.”

Iceland maintains its unique position without a standing military but with strategic importance through NATO’s Iceland Air Defense System with four radar stations and hosting rotating NATO air policing missions since 2008.

Strategic development among Western European NATO members

Germany underwent its “Zeitenwende” (turning point) in 2022, fundamentally altering its security policy guidelines and declaring the need for “combat readiness at all times.” Air defense capability was dramatically reduced from 36 Patriot squadrons in 1990 to only 12 today, with personnel reduced from 10,970 to about 2,300.

France maintained greater strategic continuity, but the 2017 strategic review acknowledged “the return of coercion through the demonstration of force and even the potential for open war in Europe.” The country continued developing SAMP/T systems while promoting European alternatives to American systems.

The United Kingdom completely reversed its 2021 assessment that the “era of fighting major tank battles on the European continent” was over. The 2025 strategic review declared Russia an “immediate and urgent threat” and the need for the army to be “ready to fight a war in Europe.”

Precise threat analysis by Eastern European members

Poland demonstrated exceptional strategic foresight through its 2016 strategic defense review, identifying Russia as an actor “aiming to strengthen its position in the global balance of power by various means, including violations of international law and regular use of force.”

Poland’s three-layer air defense system includes WISŁA (Patriot) with 8 batteries, NAREW (CAMM-ER) with 23 planned batteries by 2035, and PILICA+ (CAMM) with 22 contracted batteries. Total investment exceeds $20 billion.

The Baltic states demonstrated collective strategic clarity, with Estonia’s annual public intelligence reports consistently warning of Russian aggression. Lithuania’s NASAMS acquisitions (3 contracts since 2017, over €640 million) and Latvia’s RBS-70 NG systems (€194 million, 2025) demonstrate concrete measures.

NATO-level strategic evolution

NATO’s strategic concepts document the fundamental shift from the optimism of 2010 (“The Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low”) to the realism of 2022 (“The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace” and “not since the Cold War has the threat environment been so real”).

The 2022 Madrid Summit marked a complete reversal in threat assessment, with Russia designated as “the most significant and direct threat to allied security.” The NATO BMD program achieved initial operational capability in July 2016, and the alliance planned to purchase 1,000 Patriot missiles by 2024.

Timeline of critical turning points

• The 2008 Georgia conflict resulted in limited immediate strategic reassessment among European allies but served as a catalyst for increased threat awareness, especially in the Baltics and Poland.
• The 2014 Ukraine crisis marked the decisive turning point. Sweden’s defense establishment experienced a “brutal awakening,” Norway and Denmark began gradual policy reversals, while Eastern European allies saw their warnings validated.
• The 2022 Russian invasion triggered the most dramatic defense policy changes since the Cold War. Sweden and Finland abandoned neutrality for NATO membership, Norway enacted historic defense spending increases, and Denmark established comprehensive new defense frameworks.

Analysis of predictive accuracy

Eastern European members demonstrated superior threat analysis capability compared to Western European counterparts throughout the period. 71% of Estonians identified Russia as the primary threat before 2022, while 66% of Lithuanians held similar views. The failure of Western European powers’ analysis was clearly documented: France’s military intelligence chief was dismissed for “insufficient” briefings on Russian threats, while German intelligence (BND) was criticized for lacking strong warnings.

Geographic proximity, historical experience, and institutional culture proved more predictive of threat analysis accuracy than traditional measures of intelligence capability.

Development of ground-based air defense

The development of ground-based air defense shows clear technological and strategic trends. The European Sky Shield Initiative from 2022 involves 19 nations in joint procurement of Patriot, IRIS-T, and Arrow-3 systems. Modular GBAD programs through NATO focus on integrated, scalable air defense systems.

Industrial challenges include dependence on non-European systems, balancing NATO standardization against European autonomy, and the recognition that current production capacity is insufficient for sustained conflict.

Conclusion

The documentation reveals a fundamental shift from post-Cold War assumptions about European security to renewed recognition of the potential or risk of conventional war in Europe. Air defense emerged as a critical capability gap requiring urgent attention and significant investment.

A reactive rather than proactive approach characterized most European allies’ strategic assessments, with a significant lag between threat assessment and strategic adaptation. Convergence after 2022 shows how all European allies, despite different strategic cultures, now recognize the need for renewed territorial defense capabilities, with ground-based air defense as a central component.