On January 30, 2026, Norway signed a contract for its first land-based long-range precision fire capability. The Chunmoo deal answered one of the most pressing questions in Norwegian Army modernization. It also brought another into sharper focus.
On a Thursday morning at the end of January, Norway’s Defence Minister Tore O. Sandvik stood before cameras in Oslo and described the signing of a $922 million contract with South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace as “one of the largest investments ever made for the Army.” The K239 Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system — 16 launchers, a large package of precision-guided munitions, and an integrated logistics framework — represents Norway’s entry into land-based deep strike. For a country whose ground forces have operated without organic long-range rocket artillery, it is a meaningful threshold.
The contract is the visible part of a broader NOK 19 billion (~$2 billion) long-range fires programme. Launchers are expected in 2028 and 2029. Missiles — including variants with a stated range of up to 500 kilometers — follow in 2030 and 2031. The Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency assessed the Chunmoo as the only system in the competition that met all requirements for performance, delivery speed, and cost. Competitors from KNDS (EuroPULS), Rheinmetall, and the American HIMARS were evaluated and found wanting on one or more criteria, with KNDS eliminated from the competition in June 2025 before the final selection.
The decision places Norway in a growing group of NATO members operating or procuring the Chunmoo. Poland has ordered nearly 300 systems and established a domestic missile production line; Estonia signed an expansion of its Chunmoo order in late December 2025. Hanwha has indicated that missiles for all European customers will be supplied from Poland, a supply chain arrangement that Norway cited as a factor in its evaluation.
The Chunmoo build-out fills a capability gap that Norwegian defence planners have acknowledged for years. Long-range precision fires allow a force to suppress, disrupt, or destroy an adversary’s launch assets, command nodes, and logistics chains before they can be brought to bear. The Ukraine conflict has provided a sustained, if costly, demonstration of why this matters.
What the Chunmoo does not do — and what its procurement now sits alongside — is intercept incoming ballistic missiles.
The Ballistic Missile Gap in the LTDP
Norway’s 2025–2036 Long-Term Defence Plan (LTDP), titled The Norwegian Defence Pledge, is an unusually candid document about what the country currently lacks. The plan commits NOK 600 billion over twelve years to a comprehensive force modernization effort spanning navy, army, air force, and infrastructure. It is explicit on two air defence priorities: expansion of NASAMS and acquisition of a system to defend against tactical ballistic missiles.
The NASAMS expansion is progressing. Norway ordered new launchers and Fire Distribution Centers in December 2023 in a NOK 1.4 billion contract with Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, partly to replace systems donated to Ukraine and partly to begin planned capacity growth. A further NOK 1 billion order for NASAMS components — command posts, communications nodes, and THOR radios — was confirmed in October 2025. The LTDP foresees four additional NASAMS batteries for the Air Force and Army, along with new radars. This is a system Norway knows intimately; it co-developed and operates it, and its combat record in Ukraine — with approximately 900 successful interceptions and a reported effectiveness rate of approximately 94% against cruise missiles and Shahed-type drones — has validated the underlying investment logic.
The LTDP’s second air defence commitment is worded carefully. The government will “procure a long-range air defence system in order to protect one geographical area against tactical ballistic missiles.” As of February 2026, no system selection has been announced. No competition timeline has been publicly stated. The contrast with the fires programme — for which a parliamentary vote was held on January 16, 2026, and a contract signed two weeks later — is evident in the pace of the two programmes.
This is not an unusual state of affairs for a complex procurement involving systems at the upper end of the capability and cost spectrum. Ballistic missile defence requires a different level of political and industrial coordination than ground-based rocket artillery. But the gap in the procurement schedule invites a straightforward question: given that the threat these systems are meant to address is present now, what is Norway defending against in the interim?
The Threat Geometry of the High North
Russia’s 14th Army Corps, headquartered in Murmansk and positioned primarily on the Kola Peninsula, maintains a significant ballistic missile capability within range of Norwegian territory and critical NATO infrastructure in the High North.
The Iskander-M (NATO: SS-26 Stone) is the most operationally relevant system in this context. The 9M723 quasi-ballistic missile has a confirmed range of approximately 400–500 kilometers, flies at altitudes up to 50 kilometers, reaches speeds of Mach 6–7, and employs active maneuvering in its terminal phase — a feature specifically designed to complicate interception. The system carries both conventional and nuclear warheads and has been employed extensively in Ukraine, where it has been used against hardened infrastructure, airfields, and ammunition depots.
From the Pechenga military district near the Norwegian border, Iskander range covers a significant portion of northern Norway. Ørland Air Station — home to Norway’s F-35 fleet — sits at approximately 900 kilometers from the Kola Peninsula, potentially within reach depending on deployment location. Evenes Air Base, which hosts Norway’s P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and NATO QRA F-35s, is further north and at closer proximity to Russian launch positions. Both bases represent high-value fixed infrastructure of the kind Iskander was designed to threaten.
The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal extends this picture considerably. Launched from MiG-31K aircraft based at Olenya airfield on the Kola Peninsula, the air-launched aero-ballistic missile draws on the Iskander’s basic design but operates at substantially higher altitudes and speeds, with a reported range of 1,500–2,000 kilometers depending on carrier aircraft. A 2019 test of the Kinzhal in the Arctic — conducted from a Kola-based MiG-31K over the Barents Sea — drew attention precisely because of what it implied for the coverage geometry. The entire Norwegian mainland falls within potential Kinzhal range from Kola.
A further development warrants attention. In late 2024 and 2025, leaked Russian production documents — reported across multiple open-source outlets and analysed by UNITED24 Media — indicated that Russia has moved the 9M723-2, an extended-range Iskander variant (informally referred to as “Iskander-1000”), beyond experimental testing and into serial production. The reported range is approximately 1,000 kilometers, which would place Oslo, and potentially all Norwegian military infrastructure, within reach from ground-based launchers on Russian territory. Russia announced plans to deploy this variant from Kaliningrad in January 2025. Whether it is deployed from the Kola Peninsula remains an open question, but the production timeline suggests it will be available in increasing numbers through the period covered by Norway’s LTDP.
NASAMS, the current backbone of Norwegian ground-based air defence, is designed for threats in the low-to-medium altitude band. Its AIM-120 AMRAAM-family interceptors have demonstrated exceptional effectiveness against cruise missiles and drones in Ukraine. They are not designed to engage ballistic missiles, which follow a fundamentally different flight profile at altitudes and closing velocities outside the engagement envelope of AMRAAM derivatives. This is not a criticism of NASAMS; it reflects an engineering reality acknowledged by its developers and by NATO doctrine, which calls for dedicated upper-tier systems to address the ballistic threat layer.
What the Nordic Neighbourhood Has Chosen
Norway’s situation is more clearly defined when set against the decisions its closest neighbours have made.
Germany committed approximately €4 billion in 2023 to three batteries of the Arrow 3 ballistic missile defence system, developed jointly by Israel Aerospace Industries and Boeing. The first Arrow 3 battery achieved operational status at Holzdorf Air Base in December 2025. Germany’s rationale was explicit: lessons from Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel and Russian Iskander use in Ukraine convinced Berlin that a gap in its upper-tier defence posture was no longer acceptable. The Arrow 3 is capable of exoatmospheric intercepts, engaging ballistic missiles above the atmosphere before re-entry, at ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometers. Germany simultaneously ordered six IRIS-T SLM batteries to strengthen its medium-tier coverage, for a combined investment approaching €5 billion across the two programmes.
Finland concluded a deal in early 2025 to acquire the David’s Sling weapon system from Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, in what represented the Israeli system’s first export sale. The Finnish procurement — structured around the Stunner interceptor at an estimated $1 million per round — was explicitly framed as a response to the ballistic missile threat environment. Finland’s 1,340-kilometer border with Russia, combined with its new NATO membership, created an acute planning requirement; David’s Sling addresses it at a lower per-interceptor cost than Patriot PAC-3 MSE while offering genuine anti-ballistic capability against medium-range threats.
Denmark, having selected SAMP/T NG in September 2025 over the Patriot system, is building toward a medium-to-long-range ground-based capability. The SAMP/T NG, equipped with the Aster 30 B1NT interceptor, provides enhanced capability against ballistic missiles compared to the baseline Aster 30, with an expanded engagement envelope particularly relevant for the TBM threat layer. Denmark’s selection was framed in part by the desire to align with the Franco-Italian European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) framework and reduce dependence on American systems.
Sweden, recently joined to NATO, is acquiring IRIS-T SLM as its medium-range system while remaining under the broader NATO air defence architecture; its long-range ballistic missile defence posture is an open question.
The net result across the Nordic region is a patchwork: Finland and Germany have acquired or are acquiring dedicated ballistic missile defence systems; Denmark is moving toward an enhanced-capability system; Norway has formally acknowledged the requirement and committed to filling it — and has a procurement programme to address it, without yet having selected a system or announced a timeline.
The Candidate Systems and Norway’s Requirements
The LTDP language is specific: Norway intends to protect “one geographical area” against short-range ballistic missiles. This framing is worth examining. It suggests a defined, prioritised defensive posture rather than a national-scale ballistic missile defence shield, which would be beyond the fiscal and strategic scope of a country of Norway’s size. The question is which area, and with which system.
Several candidate systems have been discussed in open-source defence literature in the context of Norway’s requirement:
Patriot PAC-3 MSE is the most widely deployed Western system with genuine TBM capability and the most mature NATO interoperability. The PAC-3 MSE interceptor has demonstrated intercept capability against ballistic missiles in operational use, including confirmed intercepts of Russian Iskander missiles and Kinzhal-derived weapons in Ukraine. The system’s LTAMDS radar, entering service in the US and Poland, provides 360-degree coverage and substantially enhanced sensitivity compared to the legacy AN/MPQ-65. Per-interceptor cost is approximately $4–7 million. Full battery acquisition costs, including radar, command and control, and launchers, are typically in the range of $1–1.5 billion, with interceptor stockpile requirements adding considerably to the lifecycle cost.
Arrow 3 is now operational in Germany and provides exoatmospheric intercept capability — engaging ballistic missiles in space before re-entry and over a very wide defended area. Arrow 3’s per-interceptor cost is estimated at $2–3 million, lower than PAC-3 MSE, and the wide defended area per battery could make it efficient for a country seeking to protect one defined geographic zone. The system’s Israeli origin creates political and supply-chain considerations in a European context, and US technology transfer restrictions have complicated some aspects of export arrangements, though the German deal demonstrated that the pathway exists.
David’s Sling (Stunner) occupies a different niche: it is optimised for medium-range ballistic missiles, large-calibre rockets, and advanced cruise missiles, at a per-interceptor cost of approximately $1 million — significantly below the Patriot alternatives. Finland’s selection suggests this system can address the primary Iskander threat layer at a more sustainable cost-per-engagement. Norway’s threat geometry, which includes Kinzhal and potentially the new extended-range Iskander variants, raises the question of whether David’s Sling’s engagement ceiling would be sufficient for the full threat spectrum.
SAMP/T NG with Aster 30 B1NT provides enhanced ballistic missile defence within a European-sovereign supply chain. The B1NT interceptor extends the system’s capability against short-range ballistic missiles compared to the baseline, and Denmark’s selection may create supply chain and interoperability synergies within the Nordic context.
Norway has not publicly indicated which system it is evaluating, what timeline it is working toward, or what the budgeted cost envelope looks like beyond the general commitment in the LTDP.
A Balance Sheet Without a Bottom Line
The Chunmoo acquisition clarifies one dimension of Norway’s strategic calculus. Norway will, from approximately 2030, be able to strike targets at ranges up to 500 kilometers with land-based precision fire. Combined with the Naval Strike Missile, the JSM, F-35 strike capabilities, and the Type 212CD submarines under procurement, Norway is building a coherent long-range strike architecture.
The defensive side of the ledger is different in character. NASAMS expansion will continue through the LTDP period, providing robust capability against the air-breathing threat layer: cruise missiles, aircraft, drones, and low-altitude munitions. This is the layer that has been most continuously active over Ukraine, and Norway’s investment in this tier is well-grounded in operational experience.
The ballistic missile layer — the one for which NASAMS was not designed and for which the LTDP explicitly commits to a solution — remains without a confirmed procurement.
Several factors may be contributing to the longer timeline. Ballistic missile defence systems at the tier required to address Iskander involve substantially more complex integration with NATO missile defence architecture, including early warning sensors, C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, Communications) connectivity, and doctrinal alignment across the alliance. They are expensive, and the investment required for a meaningful stockpile of interceptors is considerable regardless of which system is chosen. The LTDP is explicit about geography: one area is to be protected, which implies a prioritisation choice that may involve significant political weight.
What can be observed from the outside is that Norway’s two most directly comparable neighbours — Finland and Germany — have moved from decision to contract on their ballistic missile defence programmes within the period covered by the LTDP. Germany had Arrow 3 operational before Norway’s fires contract was signed. Finland concluded its David’s Sling deal as Russia’s extended-range Iskander programme was moving into serial production.
The Chunmoo missiles will be operational from approximately 2031. The LTDP runs to 2036. At some point in that interval, Norway will need to select and field the system it has already committed to acquiring.
A Note on the Fires–Shield Relationship
There is a dimension of the Chunmoo procurement that connects directly to the air defence discussion, though it is rarely framed this way. One of the strategic arguments for long-range precision fires is their ability to suppress or destroy adversary ballistic missile launch units before they can fire. In NATO doctrine, this is part of a layered approach: offensive counter-air and deep fires reduce the number of ballistic missiles launched; terminal defence reduces the number that reach their targets.
The Chunmoo, with its 500-kilometer range and high-precision munitions, gives Norway a theoretical ability to strike Iskander TEL positions if those positions can be located and the decision to engage is made. The 200th Motorised Rifle Brigade and 61st Naval Infantry Brigade — the primary Russian ground forces near the Norwegian border in the Pechenga district — are among the assets that would host Iskander brigades in a conflict scenario. Whether Norway would be able to act against such targets in a conflict remains a question of intelligence, decision-making timelines, and alliance coordination.
The relationship between fires and terminal defence is not a substitution. Deep strike may reduce threat volumes; it does not eliminate the need for a terminal intercept capability. This is a lesson the Ukraine conflict has provided at considerable cost: even with effective counter-battery and strike operations, ballistic missiles continue to arrive. The combination of both capabilities is the stated NATO solution, and Norway’s own LTDP reflects this logic — it committed to both programmes simultaneously.
One of them has a signed contract.
Procurement timelines, system designations, and cost figures in this article are based on publicly available government announcements, manufacturer data, and open-source defence analysis current as of February 2026.
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